Why We Should Stop Conflating the Conscience with the Superego and Expand Structural Theory

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Abstract

Freud’s decision to incorporate conscience and the ego-ideal into the superego has made it difficult for us to recognize the conflicts between, for example, the superego and the conscience, the ego-ideal and the superego, the ego-ideal and the ego, etc. When we recognize five instead of three structures and the conflicts both among and within each, there are some fifteen conflicts in total, of which we have intensely studied only a few. Recognition of a conscience grounded in identification with the good part-object and distinct from the superego grounded in identification with the bad part-object enables us to understand that while in our clinical work it is essential to establish a non-judgmental atmosphere, we must carry the conscience in the treatment until such time as, with our help, our patients are able to carry it themselves, as this is their only avenue of escape from the persecutory superego.

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Although I regret not being able to be with you in Teheran, I’m very happy to have this opportunity to address the Iranian Congress of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychotherapy as to why we should stop conflating the conscience with the superego, and why we should expand psychoanalytic structural theory to include both the conscience and the ego-ideal in addition to the id, the ego and the superego.

Just as for over four decades’ psychoanalysts turned their attention away from the dynamics of guilt, self-punishment and the superego in favor of shame, narcissism, trauma and deprivation, many lost interest in or repudiated structural theory, often complaining of the reification of structural concepts. But, in my view, this rationale is really a rationalization of the retreat from psychoanalysis as, in the words of Ernst Kris (1938), “the psychology of the innermost mental processes of man in conflict” (p. 140). Most psychoanalysts have understood that the concept of mental “structure”—like that of “social structure”—is a metaphor and that psychoanalysis, like all physical and social sciences, proceeds through the use of metaphors of this sort. So the danger of reification is not really the issue; the view of psychopathology as conflict and of the mind itself as conflict is what is really being resisted here. If Karl Marx is the conflict theorist of society, Sigmund Freud is the conflict theorist of the mind. Although in many ways I have followed the Kleinian development of Freudian thought, I remain steadfastly Freudian in my adherence to the structural theory as an illuminating conceptualization of the mind in conflict. It is because I find structural theory so valuable that I want to expand it to include the two structures that in The Ego and the Id, Freud (1923) subsumed into the superego: the ego-ideal and the conscience.

In my 2013 book, The Still Small Voice, I pointed out how Freud’s decision made it difficult for us to recognize the differences between the superego and the conscience and, more importantly, to study the conflicts between them. In his 1988 book, Freud, Women and Morality: The Psychology of Good and Evil, my friend and mentor Eli Sagan had used Mark Twain’s (1885/2005) The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as the source of a superb illustration of this conflict: Huck’s racist superego demands he turn the runaway slave, Jim, in to the authorities, but his conscience requires him to protect the friend he loves. After an agonizing mental struggle, Huck tears up the letter informing on Jim, deciding he will go to Hell rather than betray his friend. Huck’s superego is racist because he was raised in a racist culture and internalized the racism forming his parents’ superegos. In explaining the superego as internalized culture (in addition to id aggression turned back against the self), Freud largely neglected to point out that it will therefore be the repository of the culture’s racism, sexism, heterosexism, authoritarianism, materialism, etc.—that is, that it will pressure the individual to act in accord with values that while normative may well be immoral by the standards of conscience. Hence, I published a paper last year (Carveth, 2015) by the title “The Immoral Superego” precisely to drive home this point. It was the Scottish psychoanalyst Ronald Laing (1967, p. 98) who pointed out that in a squadron of airplanes one plane might be out of formation, but the squadron itself may be off course—which means that the one plane that is out of formation might actually be on course. A person conforming to his superego might be in conflict with his conscience; and a person might be called by conscience to defy her superego.

In addition to allowing conscience to be subsumed by the superego, Freud never fully reconciled his differing views of the superego itself. Over time, in his clinical writings, he came increasingly to emphasize its harshness and cruelty and its central role in psychopathology as the inner sadistic tormentor resulting from turning of aggression back on the self, thus generating depression, masochism, the fear of success, being wrecked by success, self-sabotage (“clutching defeat from the jaws of victory”), becoming a “criminal from a sense of guilt” and other self-harming and self-limiting behaviors. Yet, in his sociological writings he could still view the superego as the positive force that preserves the thin veneer of civilization by preventing the barbarous id from running amok. While it is true that the superego can redirect aggression away from others and back against the self, some analysts became so focused on its prosocial benefits as Law that they lost
sight of its central role in suicide and such suicide-substitutes (Menninger, 1938) as depression, moral masochism, psychosomatic and hysterical suffering, etc., in which, like a trapped animal that chews off its leg to save its life, we bribe the murderous superego by sacrificing our careers, our sexuality, our marriages, our health ... . At times analysts have even lost sight of the antisocial behavior that results when we escape being the superego’s target by defensively identifying with it and righteously scapegoating others. Heinrich Racker (1957) described situations in which the patient places the analyst “in the situation of the dependent and incriminated ego” and develops what he called a “mania for reproaching” (p. 141). We commonly see self-righteous moralists exonerating themselves by projecting all sinfulness onto the others and glorying in cruelly castigating, punishing or exterminating them.

In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud (1930) described the build-up of guilt and self-punishment resulting from the need to preserve civilized order by repressing aggression which then, via the superego, is retroflected upon the self. But because he failed to recognize Melanie Klein’s (1948; Grinberg, 1964) crucial distinction between punitive or persecutory guilt (in which I flagellate myself for injuring another) and depressive or reparative guilt (in which I put aside my cat-o’-nine-tails and reach for my first-aid kit and begin bandaging the injured other), he failed to see that while it is true that in civilization we need less punitive guilt, we need a great deal more reparative guilt—that is, we need less superego and more conscience. Paradoxically, people often seem to prefer the shame and other varieties of pain inflicted by the superego to reconciling with conscience, experiencing contrition and making reparation. In other words, superego torment often functions as a resistance or a defence against the narcissistic injury entailed in hearing the voice of conscience, acknowledging guilt and regret, and seeking to make reparation. As Bion (1962, p. 29) understood, ultimately the analytic task involves leading people to the point where they can begin to understand that their early decision to base their lives on the avoidance of pain has only led to more pain. While some are able to reverse that early decision and face necessary pain as the only way to escape the unnecessary additional pain they bring on themselves, others are simply unwilling or unable to bear the narcissistic wound entailed in acknowledging guilt. I think this is due to an inability to overcome paranoid-schizoid splitting and achieve ambivalence. If one cannot at the same time remember one’s goodness, then any admission of badness is totalized and feels like a shameful revelation that one is a poisonously all-bad creature—a view of the self that makes not only guilt but life itself unbearable.

If psychoanalysts have at times lost sight of the destructiveness of the superego, the same can be said for the ego which, as instrumental rationality, is essential in the creation of killing machines employed in the service of superego ideologies. Associating the superego with morality and the ego with reason, psychoanalysts have found the roots of both antisocial sexuality and aggression in the id drives that Freud (1915) insisted arose from somatic sources. Civilization, he concluded, requires inhibition, especially of what he had come to view as our innate aggressive drive which, though exacerbated by frustration was, for him, ultimately a biologically-given, asocial or antisocial element of our human nature: “men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness” (Freud, 1930, p. 111). To support his view he quotes the Roman playwright Titus Maccius Plautus: “Homo homini lupus est.” Man is a wolf to man. But this comparison is deeply unfair ... to the wolves, a highly prosocial species which, to my knowledge, has never been guilty of designing death camps, or dropping atomic bombs on civilian populations, or videotaping the rape, torture and murder of their victims for future enjoyment of their humiliation and pain. Freud’s thinking often transcends common sense, but here he succumbs to it, projecting the perverse viciousness unique to humans onto animals, claiming all this “reveals man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is something alien” (p. 111).
Naturally, I am in no way disputing the fact of the human aggressiveness, destructiveness and sadism to which Freud calls our attention, only to his characterization of it as bestial or animalistic. Like Freud, we commonly project onto animals the dark, uniquely human traits we do not wish to acknowledge in ourselves. In these respects we and Freud seem to have got it backwards: the evidence suggests that our prosocial tendencies are grounded in the innate attachment systems we share with our primate cousins and in early identifications with nurturing others, while our destructiveness appears grounded in our uniquely human symbolic functions (both ego and superego) that often lead us to care more for abstractions, ideologies, and ourselves than for others or even life itself.

But what about the so-called “loving and beloved superego of Freud’s structural theory,” the topic of Roy Schafer’s influential (1960) paper by that title? While many of its readers managed to overlook what Schafer himself was honest enough to admit—that this loving superego was in no way Freud’s but Schafer’s—for me, what Schafer is describing is not the superego at all but what I distinguish as the conscience.

Recently I have widened my critique to include another mental structure, the ego-ideal, which Freud had at the same time subsumed into the superego along with the function of self-observation. While self-observation does not require a separate structure, being a self-reflexive ego function that variously involves looking at oneself from the standpoint of the superego, the ego-ideal and the conscience, I believe it makes sense to expand psychoanalytic structural theory to include the conflicts within as well as among the five mental structures: id, ego, superego, ego-ideal and conscience. I say within as well as among because we need to look at intra-systemic as well as inter-systemic conflicts—e.g., the conflicts within the id between our love and our hate; within the ego between conflicting identifications (with so-called “masculine” or “feminine” figures, for example); within the superego between opposing internalized value systems (say, between my materialism and ambition on the one hand and my altruistic ethics on the other); within the ego-ideal (say, between my ideals of courage and strength on one hand and those of caring and forgiveness on the other); and within my conscience (say, between my need to be truthful and my need to be kind).

In addition to the conflicts within each of the five structures there are the conflicts between them: between ID and ego, superego, ego-ideal and conscience; and between the EGO and the other four structures; and between the SUPERE戈 and the other four; between the EGO-IDEAL and the others; and between the CONSCIENCE and the other four structures. When we remove the overlapping categories and include the intra-systemic as well as the inter-systemic conflicts, some fifteen possible conflicts remain, only a few of which have been carefully studied due to Freud’s regrettable decision to merge five structures into three.

For example, in addition to our failure to adequately study conflict between superego and conscience—such as the “moral injury” occurring in soldiers who in obedience to their superegos committed unconscionable acts for which they cannot forgive themselves—we have largely ignored conflicts between the conscience and the ego-ideal. For example, my ideal to be a loyal member of my society, group, organization or family may seriously conflict with conscience if it judges the behavior of my society or group to be immoral. I’m sure Edward Snowden wanted to be a loyal American and I’m sure he was socialized to see that as keeping state secrets. But his conscience called him to be a whistleblower because he came to view the state as behaving immorally, unconscionably. The truth seems to be that people who develop a strong conscience represent a threat to organizations of all types because they do not consider the interests of the organization as of first importance. Their loyalty is to what is true and what is right, whereas many organizations come to consider the interests of the organization, of the group, as taking precedence over truth, justice and goodness. In this connection I recall a patient, a talented accountant, who having worked privately for years, took an important job as CFO of a large company. On welcoming him the President...
explained that “here, the company comes first.” My patient, a life-long evangelical Christian, replied: “With all due respect, sir, for me God comes first, my family second, and the company third.” He was shortly back in private practice. I’m sometimes tempted to ask my analytic colleagues, “What comes first for you, psychoanalysis or the IPA?” I predict quite a few would look confused and respond, “Aren’t they one and the same?”

Then there are the conflicts between the conscience and the ego, between what is right and what is rational. The ego is about reality-testing; it is governed by the reality principle. I’m sure Snowdon’s rational ego told him he was crazy to blow the whistle, but his conscience prevailed over both rational calculations and his merely social morality—the pseudo-morality of the superego. The superego is normative, not necessarily moral. The conscience is ethical, it represents the “still small voice” stemming from our biological inheritance as mammals, creatures who have been nursed and nurtured by “mammas” and who have identified with the nurturer as well as with the aggressor; and from the attachments we form as primates who arrive in this world with built-in, innate or pre-programmed attachment systems and needs. While conscience forms in the first months in identification with the good breast, the ideal part-object and later with the whole good object—that is, with the nurturer—the core of the superego is an identification with the aggressor, an inner tormentor, formed long before five or six years of age as Freud thought; formed in the first months of life as an identification with the bad breast, the persecutory part-object, as Klein understood.

Whereas the superego conforms to the talion law, eye for an eye, returning hate for hate, the conscience conforms to a similar law of reciprocity, returning love and nurturance for love received. All those here today, having achieved bowel control and language, have been loved, however inadequately—we know this and we know we are obliged to give love back. This is the core of conscience, the ethic of love and responsibility, what Winnicott (1963) called the “capacity for concern” for the other—a capacity we acquire as we begin to transcend Klein’s narcissistic, paranoid-schizoid position and move into the reparative position. This is a transformation that in On Narcissism, Freud (1914) had already, albeit briefly, described as from narcissism to object love, writing that “in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love” (p. 85). This is the fundamental transition (I feel the word “conversion” is justified here) that the French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1961/1969) would later describe as entailing the disruption of our narcissistic self-enclosure through the encounter with the face of the other and the recognition of our infinite obligation to respond.

This is a more fundamental part of our being-in-the-world than the societal and parental values and ideologies we internalize in socialization—values that are often so antisocial that I think their internalization might well be called “antisocial-ization.” Conscience extends far beyond the merely normative and therefore cannot be subsumed by the superego. By the same token, conscience also transcends the merely rational, for in many situations it seems rational to be immoral and highly irrational to choose the good. The ego-ideal cannot serve as a conscience, since in measuring my real ego against my ideal my focus is entirely on me, not the other. The ego-ideal is a narcissistic structure reflecting self-concern, something quite distinct from the capacity for concern for the other. If, for example, I seek to be a good parent so that I can see myself and be seen as such, this is quite distinct from the good parenting that flows from genuine love of one’s child who can certainly tell the difference.

Nor can the rational ego serve as a conscience since, while it can tell us what is or what is likely to be, it cannot tell us what ought to be. Since the 18th century work of the philosopher David Hume (1739-1740; 1748) we have understood that reason cannot deduce an ought from an is; science is descriptive not prescriptive. Like other long-standing philosophical axioms (such as the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, matters of definition and matters of fact) the fact/value distinction and the
naturalistic fallacy (the idea that the ethical can be grounded in the natural) have been subjected to critique by both “pre-modernists” seeking to revive an ancient concept of an “objective reason” supposedly capable of the intellectual apprehension of the form of the good (Horkheimer, 1947), and by “post-modernists” seeking to deconstruct the “fact/value” and “analytic/synthetic” dichotomies but, as it turns out, without being able to de-stabilize these crucial distinctions.

While Putnam’s (2002) title, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, is dramatic and appears radically challenging, the actual substance of his argument concerns only the collapse of an impossibly exaggerated or “sharp” version of the fact/value distinction. It is quite true that the preferences for logic over illogic and facts over illusions themselves entail value judgement. But to acknowledge this in no way gets around the fact that reason (and the ego that deploys it) is impotent to tell us which ends or consequences we should prefer, or even to authorize our preference for clear over muddled thinking. My preference for intellectual coherence, like my preference for pleasure over pain, cannot be objectively validated. If we attempt to do so by pointing to consequences we inevitably arrive at an ultimate value judgement (usually the preference for life over death) the entirely subjective rather than objective basis of which cannot be evaded. On examination, it becomes evident that the deconstruction and complication of the dichotomy fails to undermine Hume’s fundamental distinction. The mountain labored and brought forth a mouse.

Ultimately the value directions informing conscience come from the id: either from Freud’s (1920) Eros (Erich Fromm’s [1973] biophilia), which values love and life, or Freud’s Thanatos (Fromm’s necrophilia), which values hate and death. No one can authorize—rationally or empirically justify—the fundamental value choice between what Freud (1930) called these “immortal adversaries.” Clearly, what I am calling conscience is governed ultimately by Eros. There are those who choose differently, opting for Fromm’s “necrophilia” and what we might call a Thanatic superego.

Ultimate value choices are inevitable, unavoidable, but in my view nothing beyond ourselves requires us to choose one way or another, neither God, nor history, nor nature, nor one’s instincts or feelings. We choose and in so doing reveal who we are. In Existentialism Is a Humanism, Sartre (1946/1956) tells the story of a student, the son of an aging and dependent mother who lost her other son in the war against Hitler and is estranged from her collaborationist husband. Should he go and fight or stay and care for her? Reason cannot provide the answer; there are persuasive arguments on both sides. He could seek priestly advice, but there are collaborationist priests, priests of the resistance, and fence-sitters: he is deciding what advice to receive in choosing who to go to for it. He cannot simply consult his instincts or feelings as they conflict; which should he follow?

For Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1754/2010) our ethics derive not from reason but from feeling. He saw ethics as grounded in “pity” or fellow-feeling. But while some people feel pity or sympathy and choose to help, others are pitiless and choose either to remain indifferent or to hurt. It does no good to say those who are pitiless, indifferent or cruel are "sick," for such medical language is merely a mask for moral judgement, a spurious attempt to naturalize what are ethical choices.

In the psychoanalytic view our feelings are ultimately anchored in the drives, in Eros and Thanatos, libido and aggression, our love and our hate. But the fact that our value choices originate in our love and hate and their various combinations does not at all specify which of the drives should predominate. The fact that the superego is grounded in hate while the conscience is grounded in love in no way determines which agency is to be preferred. Some prefer love over hate, others the reverse. Some people are more lovers than haters, while others are more haters than lovers. Whereas the Sartrean existentialist will see this as our ultimate choice, the psychoanalyst will likely feel it is a choice so determined by the forces that have shaped us since
infancy as to really not amount to much of a choice at all, but rather an expression of who we have become. In any case, the rational ego certainly cannot tell us which way to go. As Freud (1930) himself puts it at the conclusion of *Civilization and Its Discontents*: "And now it is to be expected that the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers’ ..., eternal *Eros*, will make an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary. But who can foresee with what success and with what result?" (p. 145).

Freud (1933) argued that psychoanalysis has no other *Weltanschauung* than that of science itself and is only interested in “submission to the truth and rejection of illusions” (p. 182). While acknowledging that in practical life the making of *ultimate* value judgements is unavoidable, these are left to the liberty and responsibility of the individual. In this view, psychoanalysis is committed only to a *penultimate* “ethic of honesty” (Rieff, 1959, ch. 9), restricting itself to helping analysands transcend self-deception. But the idea that psychoanalysis has no ethic other than that of honesty is not honest. At best it is an illusion, hopefully without a future. For, like it or not, “Where id was there ego shall be” (Freud, 1933, p. 79) is a moral imperative requiring far more than replacing illusion with truth: it enjoins us to transcend impulsive action and, instead, develop ego strength, prudence, discretion and rational self-mastery. Developing ego where id was “is a work of culture—not unlike the draining of the Zuider Zee” (p. 80); sublimation of primitive drive is encouraged. But overcoming our illusions, developing self-control, sublimating our drives—this is still not enough. In addition, we must transcend narcissism in favour of object love, we must bind *Thanatos* with *Eros*, and we must overcome the harsh, primitive superego that is a “pure culture of the death instinct” (Freud, 1923, p. 52). In these and other ways the Freudian ethic far exceeds the demand for self-knowledge. Psychoanalytic therapy, however much it has tried to disguise the fact, has always implicitly chosen, advocated and practiced an ethic it refuses to preach, an ethic in which love is better than hate; life is better than death; kindness is better than cruelty; gratitude is better than envy; etc. I share and do my best to practice these values, but I cannot claim they are authorized by God or by the deified Reason with which we have sought to replace him.

In my view a central aim of psychoanalysis and analytic therapy is to emancipate conscience from its domination by both the superego and the ego, by both internalized pseudo-morality and by instrumental reason. And the single most important requirement for training and practice as a psychotherapist is to have a well-developed and functioning conscience, not merely a sophisticated ego (many psychopaths have that), nor merely a well-socialized, normative superego (for well-socialized and superego-driven people often behave unconsciously). Robert Lifton’s (1986) studies of the Nazi doctors revealed they were, for the most part, racist ideologues who were no more psychopathic than Truman and those who dropped atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki without giving the Japanese a prior opportunity to observe a test. Although psychopathic leaders, such as Stalin, certainly contribute disproportionately to human destructiveness, the greater part of it is not committed by psychopathic personalities but by superego-driven “do-gooders” who commit evil in the name of what their ideologies define as good.

Since the ego-ideal is a narcissistic structure in which I focus on myself, not the other, and since while my rational ego can bring reason to bear on questions of value it cannot generate them or authorize value choices, it is necessary to posit conscience as the ethical centre of the personality, grounded in our mammalian and primate sociality, our attachments, and our identifications with our nurturers. Only if it can recover from its own guilt-evasion, proceed to study the conflicts within and among the five structures, and re-orient itself on a conscientious basis can psychoanalysis hope to realize its emancipatory potential for our patients, our societies and our world. Analysts have recognized the importance of careful self-observation and monitoring of our countertransference in maintaining responsible clinical work, but such self-monitoring is only fruitful when it is informed and guided by a well-developed conscience, not merely by rules enforced by a castrating and intimidating superego. While the well socialized and superego-driven analyst will refrain from sexually exploiting patients out of a fear of being caught, the conscientious therapist will do so out of...
genuine concern for their welfare.

In dealing with problems of guilt it is important to distinguish that for which we are truly responsible from that which has been induced in us through projective identification by others too narcissistic to bear it themselves. It is a great mistake to attribute the inferiority feelings of oppressed races and classes to their own wrongdoing when they are the victims of massive projective identification on the part of their oppressors. Freud (1923, p. 50, n. 1) described people who suffer from so-called “borrowed” guilt, a term that, as Paola Leon (2015) has pointed out, is quite misleading in that the subject never asked to borrow it and the last thing its donors want is for it to be given back! But these exceptions aside, a great deal of the pain and symptomatology from which our patients suffer arises from guilt-evasion—from their refusal to bear reparative guilt. When patients complain about feeling “guilty” and yet carry on with behavior that is harmful to themselves or others, they may well be experiencing persecutory states such as shame and anxiety but this does not amount to mature (reparative) guilt (Carveth & Hantman, 2003). We need to help them understand that the only escape from such persecutory pseudo-guilt is through reconciliation with conscience and the move into contrition and reparation. While the narcissistic ego may experience this as a crucifying process, it offers the only avenue of escape from the persecutory superego.

The clinical requirement that the therapist maintain a non-judgmental attitude is intended to protect patients from the analyst’s moralizing which would only strengthen rather than weaken their tyrannical superegos. But therapists who confuse neutrality vis-à-vis the superego with neutrality vis-a-vis the conscience are in clinical error. As Susan Buechler (2016) has recently pointed out in an essay entitled “Choose Life: Erich Fromm’s Clinical Values”:

Some analysts try to prove they have no vision of health. They just follow the patient’s lead, expressing no values of their own. To me, this is the post-modern edition of the classical analyst’s neutrality. On the contrary, I think we can’t function without the inspiration that conviction can lend us. Passionate desires for our patients can center us and imbue our work with stamina and courage. ... But my main argument when analysts profess they are not motivated by their own values is that I don’t believe it is true. How we understand health shapes what we focus on, remember, and comment on, whether we know it or not. There is no such thing as value-free treatment (p. 2).

Most psychoanalysts value love and life over hate and death. It is only by helping our patients reconcile with their loving conscience that we strengthen them vis-a-vis their superego’s sadism—liberating them, not from the analyst’s moralism but their own. Despite revealing the power of self-deception and wishful illusion in much of his work, a naively rationalist Freud (1927) succumbed to them in affirming his faith in reason: “The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing” (p. 52). Regrettably, like the voice of reason, the still small voice of conscience frequently goes unheard owing to a range of defenses against it. In recent years we have heard a great deal about our responsibility to offer patients essential analytic “holding” and “containment” in a non-judgmental “atmosphere of safety”—i.e., an atmosphere free of superego moralizing—but very little about the need to find tactful, respectful and therapeutically effective ways to confront and evoke conscience in guilt-evading patients. We offer them a zone of free speech, a place for communication liberated from socially normative judgment. But at the same time we must carry the conscience for them until with our help they have learned to hear and bear it themselves. To accomplish this, therapists must overcome their own guilt-evasion. Curæ te ipsum—“Physician, heal thyself” (Luke 4:23).
References